Electoral Reform and Party Financing
Bill C-16, An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act: Brief to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs
October 3, 2006

Posted below is the brief submitted by the Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada to the Standing Committee on Procedure on House Affairs of the House of Commons on Bill C-16, An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act.

Bill C-16 is legislation for fixed election dates. It was introduced in the House of Commons on May 30, 2006 by Government House Leader and Minister for Democratic Reform Rob Nicholson. At second reading of the Bill September 18, the Minister stated that the legislation would address concerns about the "situation where the Prime Minister is able to choose the date of the election, not based necessarily on the best interests of the country but on the best interests of his or her political party." The Bill was debated in Parliament on September 18 and 19 and referred to the Standing Committee on Parliamentary Procedure and House Affairs for review.

The legislation establishes Monday, October 19, 2009 as the date of the next general election, following which elections would be held every four years on the third Monday of October. The Act also gives the Chief Electoral Officer the power to propose an alternate date in a situation where the stipulated date conflicts with a provincial or territorial election or with a cultural or religious date of significance. He is restricted to proposing either the Tuesday after the stipulated Monday or the Monday a week later. These provisions are to be included in a new section in the Canada Elections Act under the heading "Writ of Election." The first clause of the new section affirms the prerogative of the Prime Minister to seek an earlier election in the event of a non-confidence motion or in the event of his desire to renew his mandate and affirms the Governor General's powers to decide these matters. It states:

"56.1 (1) Nothing in this section affects the powers of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General's discretion."

In its first three sessions, the Committee heard from members of the Privy Council and the Department of Justice and the representatives of parties in the House of Commons and the Green Party. The chief electoral officers of Canada and British Columbia also appeared as witnesses. It is expected that the Committee will conclude its deliberations after its meeting on Thursday, October 5 at which time it is scheduled to hear from a panel of academics comprised of Prof. Andrew Heard, Associate Professor Political Science Department, Simon Fraser University, Prof. Louis Massicotte, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Montreal and Visiting professor in Democracy and Elections, American University and Prof. Henry Milner, Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, Umea University.

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Gary Goodyear
Chairperson
Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

Chairperson and Members of the Committee,

The Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada (MLPC) welcomes the opportunity to present its opinions on Bill C-16, An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act by setting fixed election dates.
           
Position of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada

The MLPC is on record as standing for a renewed political and electoral process which  includes the holding of elections at fixed intervals. The MLPC has argued in various forums that the calling of an election should not be an occasion to launch a surprise attack on electors who are already marginalized.  Elections should not be called in a manner which privileges the party-in-power to the detriment of other parties or independent candidates. Nor should the threat of calling an election be used by the party-in-power to subvert the role of  members of parliament  as elected representatives of the people who are expected to deliberate on legislation to ensure it serves the public good.

Bill C-16,  however, does not address  the issue of how to call elections so as to end these practices. The aim of the bill is not to fulfill the desires expressed by Canadians to exercise control over their members of parliament, the parliament itself, and  the government and to be empowered. On the contrary, Bill C-16,  like other legislation  presented in the name of democratic renewal, avoids the key issue of ending the domination of the political process by political parties and the concentration of power in the hands of fewer and fewer people. The changes that have been implemented over the past decade and a half show that in the name of restoring the confidence of Canadians in the democratic institutions, the concentration of power at the top is being further entrenched. So long as these changes continue to ignore the need to empower Canadians by providing them with the mechanisms through which they can exercise their right to elect and to be elected and their right to an informed vote in elections that are seen to be consistent with democratic conceptions of equality and fairness, they can only lead to further alienation of the electors and increasing political disaffection.

Not a Motherhood Issue

In the opinion of the Marxist-Leninist Party, the deliberations  in the House of Commons through second reading of Bill C-16 and in this committee to date  cannot be considered a proper inquiry into the matter at hand.

As in the case of the Federal Accountability Act, the question of fixed election dates is presented as a motherhood issue on which the stand to be taken is supposed to be patently obvious. Who could be against "fixed election dates" as opposed to the date being decided by "back-room consultants and advisers?"  This approach constrains debate and deliberation and has no other aim than to railroad the legislation, as seen in the remarks of  Minister for Democratic Reform Rob Nicholson. In response to proposals for amendments to Bill C-16, the Minister said: "I find it distressing and troubling that members of the Liberal Party would oppose, in any way, shape or form, a sense of accountability that would bring transparency and fairness to this place."

We do not see how claims can be made that government accountability is being restored while legislation is being passed for which it would seem nobody can be held accountable in terms of where it is taking us.  In this light, the MLPC would like to elaborate the reasons why it believes Bill C-16 should be rejected.

On the Stated Benefits of Fixed Election Dates

One of the key problems facing the Canadian polity is the loss of confidence and trust in politicians, political parties, parliament,  and the political process as a whole. It is stated that the introduction of fixed election dates will contribute to eliminating what is described as the "cynicism" of the Canadian electorate. Other projected benefits  attributed to  fixed election dates include increased voter turn-out, more fairness in elections, increased cooperation amongst the political parties in the House of Commons, attracting better candidates, increasing the representation of women in government, and even strengthening the Canadian economy.

The central purported benefit is that fixed election dates will counter the concentration of power in the office of the Prime Minister. Gone will be the day, it is said, when election dates are selected behind closed doors by the Prime Minister and his advisers, based on partisan political interest rather than the interests of the polity.

This is simply not true. Bill C-16 clearly states that the provisions stipulating fixed-date elections are subordinate to "the power of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General's discretion." The legislation will not change the situation where the timing of elections is determined by the relative power of the political parties in the House of Commons and their strategic partisan calculations.

While members of parliament have acknowledged that  Bill C-16 does not legally constrict the power of the Prime Minister, they are saying that Bill C-16 will create an expectation  that the party-in-power will not exercise the royal prerogative. It is said that the ability of a prime minister to call an election will be curtailed by the expectation both in the House of Commons and amongst the electors that calling an election for self-serving partisan interests is  unacceptable. The fact is that this practice has long been considered unacceptable by Canadians and this has never stopped it. Why would an expectation enshrined in law change that practice now?

If the government presenting this legislation is serious about ending parliamentary brinkmanship through the threat of an election, why is it engaging in brinkmanship now? Even as Bill C-16 was being debated, the vote on the softwood lumber deal was on the agenda as a motion of non-confidence. The Harper Government  presented it as a confidence motion precisely to hold the threat of an election over the heads of the Liberal members of parliament, whose party is in the midst of selecting a leader, and the Bloc Quebecois members in the hope of enhancing Conservative electoral fortunes in Quebec.

The argument that an expectation will be created against the calling of elections for self-serving partisan aims and that this will restore the confidence of Canadians in parliament could only have merit if the conviction could be created amongst Canadians that a change has been instituted which benefits their desire for empowerment. Far from it, Canadians will not see any changes  because nothing will change as a result of this legislation.

It has also been argued in the House that this expectation would create political stability and allow members of parliament to debate legislation more freely and to oppose such legislation if necessary without fear of an election being precipitated. This argument is also phoney. If the aim is to restore the role of the members of parliament, then power should be placed in the hands of the members of parliament and not political parties.

The unfolding of these events  confirms the  perception of Canadians about the self-serving nature of the political parties in the House of Commons, particularly the view that none of these parties is interested in bringing about changes that would weaken their position of privilege and power in the polity in general and the position of the ruling party in particular. The parties in the House of Commons have shown that they  want to retain the royal prerogative so that they will be able to use it when they are in power.

In such a situation, the passage of legislation for fixed election dates and the inevitable and completely predictable situation where elections will again be called on the same old basis will only increase the loss of prestige and legitimacy of politicians, political parties and Parliament itself and create further political discontent. This  will  create further damage to the Canadian polity. Once again, Canadians will see that "democratic renewal" has been turned into an exercise in propaganda aimed at creating the appearance that their desire for empowerment is being addressed but in fact concentrating political power in the hands of a few.

Reforms Must be Guided by the Need to Empower Canadians

In our opinion, reforms must be motivated by the essence of the discontent expressed by Canadians through the Citizen's Forum on Canada's Future  (The Spicer Commission, 1991) and the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (The Lortie Commission, 1991). In other words,  the reforms should be guided by the need to provide Canadians with mechanisms to exercise their right to elect and to be elected and their right to participate in arriving at the decisions affecting the society upon which they depend. Foremost among these decisions are those relating to how Canadians govern themselves.

During the public hearings of the Spicer and Lortie Commissions, Canadians presented many proposals for electoral and political reforms. These opinions and proposals have generally been ignored. Why is this particular aspect of electoral reform being acted upon, in a manner which does not eliminate the royal prerogative and does not empower Canadians,  while other reforms, such as proportional representation, or the right to recall and to initiative, are  ignored?

According to the Minister for Democratic Reform, the Canadian people have been asked their opinion on the issue of fixed election dates through an Ipsos-Reid poll. This is provided by the Government as evidence that their reform corresponds to the wishes of the people. Given all the issues raised by Canadians, the argument that the government is introducing fixed election dates because Canadians said so in a poll is clearly a self-serving one.

When did asking random questions by means of polls become synonymous with the long-accepted methods of garnering and creating public opinion? Random polling cannot be a substitute for the involvement of Canadians in deliberations. By providing the relevant information required, Canadians as well as Members of Parliament could  present reasoned and coherent arguments on the matter at hand and draw warranted conclusions.

In fact, one of the objections that Canadians raised through these forums was precisely the growing use of polls to establish self-serving justifications for what the government is doing. In the words of one Canadian who participated in the Spicer Commission: "We can speak only twice a decade. Then we must suffer the indignity of being told, ‘The people of Canada have elected and therefore...' We have learned to distrust this method. It is not up to politicians to effect a change in the fabric of the country... They must listen to the people rather than a battery of advisors. This cannot be done by polls. Socrates demonstrated that questions predict answers."

The manner in which the legislation for fixed election dates has been introduced begs the question: what is motivating these reforms? In this regard, a serious concern is surfacing as to fixed election dates being driven by the push for the integration of  Canada, the U.S.A. and Mexico into a North American Union. This concern is strengthened by various developments. There was the signing of the Security and Prosperity Partnership Agreement by former Prime Minister Martin and then its affirmation by Prime Minister Harper. Then came the recently disclosed holding of  secret meetings of cabinet ministers, generals and top CEOs from these three countries to discuss Continental Prosperity in the New Security Environment. Now, documents have been leaked revealing that there are plans afoot to establish one government for all three countries. We do not think that suspicions linking the introduction of fixed election dates with the plans for  North American integration can be dismissed as a conspiracy theory.

On the Issue of the Confidence Convention

The MLPC is also concerned about the apparent disregard that is being shown for the political theory upon which the existing political system is based. Even though the MLPC believes that this political theory is outmoded and its method of establishing representation and responsible government belongs to a period when only white men of property were franchised,  the apparent disregard that is shown for the theoretical foundations of responsible government is highly suspect. We think it can only serve to hide the concentration of power in fewer and fewer hands.     

It is clear that fixed election dates are in conflict with the underlying premise of the Westminster system, according to which the Cabinet must retain the confidence of the majority of the House of Commons. This was also the conclusion of the 1984 study prepared by Eugene Forsey and Graham Eglington for the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons entitled The Question of Confidence in Responsible Government. The study  included a section entitled "A Fixed Term for the House of Commons? No." It  argued that fixed-election dates would require constitutional reform and it also argued that a fixed-term House of Commons "could further enhance executive domination of the House." Nonetheless, we are being told that a fixed-term House of Commons will weaken executive domination  and that it is a practical matter with no need to revisit the constitution. Prime Minister Harper has stated that his government's changes are "practical" and he has attributed a positive quality to them because they "can be achieved without full scale constitutional negotiations."

Whether or not they are practical, or substantial, or anything else,  the constitutional framework informing the Canadian political process is  certainly germane to the issue at hand. In this regard, the debate on Bill C-16 is circumventing  one of the most fundamental questions, that is, the issue of the constitutional basis of the electoral and political process, its inherent concentration of power in the Cabinet and the office of the Prime Minister, as well as the continued powers of a foreign sovereign.

The fact remains that these reforms are introducing incoherence in the functioning of the political institutions and electoral process and this is fraught with unforeseen consequences.

Other Issues

One of the unforeseen consequences is the impact of fixed election dates on the political financing regime. The financing provisions introduced by Bill C-24 show how, in the name of eliminating "undue influence," political parties are being turned into state institutions. From primary political organizations said to be the centrepiece of representative and responsible government, they are being transformed into instruments of powerful elites to implement agendas that are discussed behind closed doors and not subjected to any deliberation by the members of the political parties, let alone by the public.

Bill C-24 was passed by the Chretien Liberal Government with an amendment introduced by the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs  requiring a review of the political financing regime. The Chief Electoral Officer was to present this review in his statutory reports and he informed Parliament that a sufficient period of time was required to carry this review out properly. Even before this review was carried out, Bill C-2, the Federal Accountability Act, has introduced further changes to the financing regime whose impact is still unknown.

The recent example of the Conservative Party's convention fees and the allegations that it has accepted illegal contributions shows how the Conservative Party itself has been caught in its own web. Instead of sobering up and ending the self-serving approach to electoral reforms, hooliganism is prevailing. This is seen in the manner in which various party officials, including members of parliament, are challenging the Chief Electoral Officer's affirmation of his offices' long-standing interpretation of the Canada Elections Act vis a vis the issue of convention fees. They are suggesting that their reading of the act is as good as any. We can only imagine these officials at a hockey game challenging the  calls of the official arbiter of the game and insisting on their right to do so. Hooliganism it is and it is not acceptable conduct by any conceivable standards.

The question of the political financing regime is also not irrelevant to the issue of Bill C-16. The MLPC  thinks that fixed election dates will cause havoc to the election financing regime. Already election campaigning extends far beyond the so-called election campaign period through which election spending is supposed to be limited. Fixed election dates are bound to extend it further and create an even unfairer playing field. The ramifications of Bill C-16 in this regard are not considered. Debate is reduced to some members of parliament saying that Canadians will be subjected to American-style protracted election campaigning and other members of parliament saying, no, this will not happen and others saying that it will be terrific because it will permit party volunteers to plan their time off.

The introduction of fixed election dates also does nothing to address the disequilibrium which beset the Canadian parliamentary system following the 1993 general election. At that time, the failure to address the constitutional crisis of the Canadian federation resulted in the break-down of the stability based on a parliament comprised of a party-in-power and a party-in-opposition with national representation. The crisis of the big parties is such that the equilibrium is yet to be restored. Declarations to the  effect that fixed-election dates will restore stability to the political system cannot make this problem facing the parliamentary democracy disappear. The fact remains that the functioning of parliament on the basis of a party-in-power and a party-in-opposition has had the rug pulled out from under it and this situation highlights the need for reforms which address this and other problems rather than compounding them.

Revisiting the Decisions of the 38th Parliament on the Need to Engage Citizens and Parliamentarians in an Examination of Our Electoral System

We would like to remind members of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs  that in the 38th Parliament, the Speech  from the Throne directed this same committee  "to recommend a process that engages citizens and parliamentarians in an examination of our electoral system with a review of all options."

The Final Report of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs stated:

 "... despite different approaches to the study of electoral reform, it is clear that no contemplated change can be done without citizen engagement. A successful consultation strategy will ensure that the process is, and is seen to be, objective transparent and accountable. Citizen engagement also gives legitimacy to the recommendations that are made. The electoral system must reflect the views, the priorities, and the values of Canadians and their involvement is essential."
   

This report was endorsed by the NDP and Liberal members of the Standing Committee, while the Conservative Party and the Bloc Quebecois  issued supplementary reports. The Committee proposed a process in which a "citizens consultative group would make recommendations on the values and principles Canadians would like to see in their democratic and electoral systems." It stated that the actual decision-making should be left in the hands of Parliament, arguing that "ultimately, any decision to change the electoral system is a political one," meaning that only the politicians should decide.

While the Bloc Quebecois expressed its concern about the method through which the "citizens consultative group" would be appointed and said that the Liberals could not be trusted on this matter, the Conservative Party issued a supplementary opinion arguing for greater involvement of the electors. It said that it favoured the establishment of "a national Citizens' Assembly on the model of the one that was used to design electoral reforms for British Columbia." It went on to say that part of the success of the BC Citizens' Assembly was that it could not be accused of "being motivated by partisanship, a desire to protect any special interest or group of special interests, or by pressure to achieve elite accommodation at the expense of the general good." The Supplementary Opinion projected a situation in which a Conservative Government might be in power and stated that "a Conservative government would not implement any proposal for substantial change to the electoral system, until the change is endorsed in a national referendum."

Are we then to believe that introducing legislation for fixed election dates is not "a substantial change" to the electoral system and the changes therefore do not have to be endorsed by a national referendum?  If this is the case, where is the deliberation that established that it is not substantial?  Whether it is or is not substantial, and indeed what is the significance of the reform, is not  seriously dealt with in the discussion in the House of Commons on this Bill.  What are Canadians to make of the honesty,  sincerity and accountability  of the Conservatives  who seem to have forgotten the statements presented in their Supplementary Report?  It appears  that the Liberals, the NDP and the Bloc Quebecois have also abandoned their own decisions about the need to involve Canadians in determining the kind of democratic and electoral system they want to see.